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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
Formal Requirements
The Louisiana Civil Code requires, under penalty of nullity, that an act
be passed before a notary and two witnesses of every donation inter vivos,
whether of movables, immovables, or incorporeals, and that in order to
have effect, the donation must be accepted by the donee in precise terms
either in the act of donation itself, or in a subsequent act also passed before a
notary and two witnesses.' A donation inter vivos may nevertheless result
from other contracts or transactions that, though not labeled as donations,
confer a gratuitous advantage upon the intended donee.2 A donation is
nonetheless a donation because it is in the form of a stipulation pour autrui
in favor of a gratuitous beneficiary, 3 or because it is made indirectly, or in
disguise in the form of a sale or other onerous contract in which no price is
paid, or in which the stipulated price is much below the fair value of the
thing sold.4 Yet, if the strict formalities of articles 1536-1538 were not
observed, these and other similar transactions would be invalid. Certificates
of stock and other negotiable instruments which represent incorporeal rights
insusceptible of manual gifts, could not be given absent the formal require-
ments of a notarial act and the express acceptance by the donee. Neverthe-
less, the jurisprudence, without exempting these transactions from the strict
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1536, 1538, 1540. An exception is immediately made in
the case of donations of corporeal movables which can be made by simple delivery.
In such donations the express acceptance of the donee is necessarily dispensed with,
it being implied from his taking corporeal possession of the things given. Id. arts.
1539, 1541. See Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word v. Emery, 114 La. 614, 81 So. 99
(1919). But cf. Works v. Noble, 177 La. 618, 149 So. 423 (1933).
2. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1248.
3. Id. arts. 1890, 1902.
4. Id. art. 1248: "The advantage which a father bestows upon his son, though in
any other manner than by donation or legacy, is likewise subject to collation. Thus,
when a father has sold a thing to his son at a very low price, or has paid for him the
price of some purchase, for [or] has spent money to improve his son's estate, all that
is subject to collation." (Emphasis added).
Id. art. 2444: "The sales of immovable property made by parents to their
children, may be attacked by the forced heirs as donations in disguise if the latter can
prove that no price has been paid or that the price was below one-fourth of the real
value of the immovable sold at the time of the sale." (Emphasis added).
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formalities contained in these articles of the Code, has upheld the validity of
many such transfers on other grounds. But these decisions lack uniformity
and clarity.' Primeaux v. Libersat6 is illustrative. The defendant was the
registered owner of corporate shares that either had been issued to him
initially by the corporation at the time of incorporation, or subsequently
re-issued to him in place of other shares that had been surrendered to the
corporation by the initial owners thereof. Although admitting the incorpore-
al nature of the shares, the supreme court, upon determining that the
defendant was in fact the legal owner of the shares, because they were issued
to him in accordance with the applicable law, concluded that since the
consideration for their issuance had in fact been paid by the defendant's
father with donative intent, the defendant had validly acquired them [from
the corporation?] by donation, without the necessity of the additional
formality of an authentic act. 7 The decision leaves one with the impression
that perhaps the court was thinking more in terms of a donation of the money
rather than of a donation of the shares themselves. 8 Problems such as this
5. A check issued and delivered by the drawer-donor to the payee-donee and by
the latter cashed before the donor's death was held valid as a manual gift of the money
on deposit; but the delivery of a promissory note payable to the payee-donor and by
him endorsed to the donee-endorsee was held to be an incorporeal right not suscep-
tible of a manual gift. Succession of DePouilly, 22 La. Ann. 97 (1870).
On the other hand, a check certified at the instance of the drawer (in which case
the certifying bank becomes a promisor) and payable to the payee-donor and by the
latter endorsed and delivered to the endorsee-donee was held to constitute a donation
of the fund in the hands of the certifying bank. Succession of LeRoy, 157 La. 1077,
103 So. 328 (1925).
So also, the purchase of an immovable in the name of another has been held to be
a valid donation of the immovable (or perhaps of the money paid?) although the
formal requirement of an express acceptance by the "vendee" was lacking. Cotton v.
Washburn, 228 La. 832, 84 So. 2d 208 (1955).
And the gratuitous transfer of corporate stock (which is undeniably an incor-
poreal right) has been held to constitute a valid donation inter vivos without the
formality of an authentic act. LeBlanc v. Volker, 198 So. 398 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1940).
And in Succession of Weiss, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), the
purchase of United States Savings bonds payable to alternate payees was held to
constitute an additional method of making donations inter vivos.
6. 322 So. 2d 147 (La. 1975).
7. "Louisiana interpretations hold the present transfers of shares of stock to
the donee, valid under the stock transfer act. . . to be valid also as donations to him,
because the consideration for their issuance was furnished by the donor with such
donative intent." Id. at 152.
8. The court, making reference to 3 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 3, no.
2453A at 244 (11 th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959), notes that where property is
purchased in the name of another, the object of the donation is not the acquired
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could not have arisen under the Digest of Laws of 1808, article 53.9 Under
that provision, only those acts which purported on their face to be or to
contain donations inter vivos had to be in authentic form. Consequently, a
donation disguised in the form of a sale could be effective as a valid donation
inter vivos even though the act of sale was not in authentic form. 10 And the
same result occurs under the source article in the Code Napol6on. " But the
redactors of the Code of 1825 suppressed article 53 of the Digest, as being
included in what are now articles 1536-1538 of the present Code, 12 and the
Louisiana Supreme Court, in 1898, noting the difference in the language
used, was quick to hold that a deliberate change had been made and that,
under the provisions of article 1536, in order to have effect as a donation, the
instrument whereby the conveyance was made had to be in authentic form. 13
The writer suggests, in light of the reasons given by the redactors for the
suppression of the provisions formerly contained in the Digest,' 4 that no
material change was actually intended, and that the rule of article 1536
should be applicable only in those cases where the instrument whereby the
conveyance is made professes to be a donation.' 5
property, but the sum of money paid for it, which is the equivalent of an indirect
manual gift, relieving the nominal purchaser from the payment of the price.
9. La. Digest of 1808, art. 53, p. 2 2 0 . "All acts containing donations inter vivos
must be passed before a notary and two witnesses in the usual form of con-
tracts .... " Id.
The corresponding article 931 of the Code Napoldon (1804) is as follows: "All
acts importing a donation inter vivos shall be passed before notaries in the usual form
of contracts..."and in the Projet du Gouvernement (1800) Book III, Title IX, art.
46, the proposed article reads as follows: "All acts containing a donation inter vivos,
must be passed before a notary in the usual form of contracts... (Emphasis
added).
10. Trahan v. McManus, 2 La. 209 (1831).
11. See 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN4;AIS § 659(2) (6th ed. Esmein 1954)
in C. LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 102 et seq. (1969) [hereinafter cited as
AUBRY ET RAU]; 3 PLANIOL, TRAIT9 EL Mf-NTAIRE DE DROITCIVIL n 2543 et seq. (11th
ed. 1959).
12. 1 La. Legal Archives, Projet, p. 209 (1937).
13. Lambert v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 24 So. 16 (1898),
where the court stated: "But this article was changed in the Code of 1825 so as to
make the law declare that 'an act shall be passed before a notary and two witnesses of
every donation.' etc. . . . The conclusion we announce on this subject is that a
donation made in the form of an onerous contract . . . which is not such because
without consideration, and really intended as a donation in disguise, to have effect as
a donation, must be passed before a notary public and two witnesses."
14. The article was already included in the proposed text of the new provisions
suggested. See I La. Legal Archives, Projet, p. 209 (1937).
15. Cf. concurring opinion by St. Paul, J., in Succession of LeRoy, 157 La. 1077,
1083, 103 So. 328, 331 (1925), in which he suggests that article 1536 of the Civil Code
should be held to apply only to credits that are not otherwise transferable by delivery,
or by delivery plus endorsement.
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Donations with Reservation of Usufruct
In Estate of Richard v. Richard,'6 the dative testamentary executor
filed suit against an heir of the testator to declare the nullity of a donation
inter vivos made to him by the testator with reservation of usufruct in
violation of article 1533 of the Louisiana Civil Code. 7 He alleged that
although the act of donation recited that the donation was onerous, the value
of the alleged services was less than half the value of the property given. ' 8
The lower court sustained the defendant's exception of no right of action on
the basis of article 1504 of the Civil Code which limits the right to seek
reduction of excessive donations to the forced heirs, their heirs or assigns.
The court of appeal reversed on the grounds that since the plaintiff had
alleged facts which, if established, would make the donation purely
gratuitous and therefore, a radical nullity, the donation could be attacked by
any interested party, including the succession representative, who, under
article 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure is expressly authorized to enforce
rights of the deceased or of his succession.' 9
Donations Omnium Bonorum
In 1957, by three separate acts of sale in authentic form, I.M. Owen
sold three tracts of land as follows: Tract 1, consisting of 40 acres to W.H.
Owen for a stipulated price of $100; Tract 2, also consisting of 40 acres to
J.B. Owen, for a stated price of $720; and Tract 3, consisting of 15 acres,
jointly to W.H. and J.B. Owen, for $300. The acts of sale, duly recorded,
recited that the stipulated price had been paid in cash, receipt of which was
acknowledged. There was nothing in these instruments to indicate that the
vendor was the father of the vendees, nor that the property sold constituted
all the property of the vendor. In 1972, some 15 years after the death of the
vendor, J.B. Owen sold his interest in Tract 3 to his brother W.H. Owen,
and in 1973, W.H. Owen sold both his tracts (Tracts 1 and 3) to the
16. 321 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
17. Article 1533 of the Louisiana Civil Code has since been amended by La. Act
210 of 1974 restoring the provisions of the La. Digest of 1808, art. 50, p. 220,
permitting the donor to reserve to his own advantage the usufruct of the immovable
given.
18. Under LA. CIV. CODE art. 1526, the rules of donations inter vivos are
applicable only where the value of the thing given greatly exceeds (by one-half) the
value of the service or charge.
19. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 685:"... [T]he succession representative ... is the
proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the deceased or of his succession while the
latter is under administration. The heirs or legatees of the deceased whether present
or represented in the state or not, need not be joined as parties, whether the action is
personal, real, or mixed."
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defendants Wayne S. and Charles W. Bush. Nine months later, the six other
children of the vendor, including J.B. Owen, brought suit to revendicate the
property from the defendants, alleging that the sales from I.M. Owen to his
sons were simulations, and in the alternative, that they were donations in
disguise omnium bonorum, prohibited by article 1497 of the Civil Code.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal, having found, as had the trial court,
that the sales in question were in fact donations inter vivos and that the donor
had divested himself of all of his property without reserving enough for his
subsistence, 20 rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the
donations were void ab initio and therefore not translative of ownership,
and that consequently, the defendants were not entitled to the protection
afforded by the public records doctrine. 2 1 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
although in agreement with the trial and appellate courts that the sales by
I.M. Owen to his sons were donations rather than simulations, a valid
transfer animus donandi having taken place, 22 was not as ready as the lower
courts had been to find that donations omnium bonorum had been made.
23
Nevertheless, (and assuming for the purposes of its decision that the
donations were in fact omnium bonorum,) the court set aside the judgments
of the courts below, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit holding that since
there was nothing of record to indicate that the vendor had divested himself
of all his property without reserving enough for his subsistence, the vendees
20. The record nevertheless indicated that the vendor was entitled to and was
receiving social security benefits and that at the time of his death he still had $600 in
cash.
21. Owen v. Owen, 325 So. 2d 283, 288,289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976): "When the
donation is or is deemed to be self-evident, it is a question of fact whether the donor
has retained sufficient property for his subsistence . . . and not withstanding the
protection afforded third party purchasers by the public records doctrine, the
purchaser from the donee assumes the risk of losing the property to the donor or his
forced heirs (after the death) because of the nullity declared by La. C.C. Art. 1497. In
such a case, the donation, in whatever form or however disguised is not an act
translative of title . ..
"Under the circumstances of this case, the donation in disguise was void
ab-initio under La. C.C. Art. 1497. The sale disguised as a donation here (sic) [the
donation disguised as a sale?] was not an act translative of title. (Emphasis
added).
22. In a simulation pure and simple, no actual transfer is intended by the parties
and consequently the transaction is ineffective as a conveyance.
23. "In order to sustain an attack on a gift as a donation omnium bonorum the
heirs must prove conclusively that the donation divested the donor of all of his
property (citing cases). In light of the stringent requirement set forth in the aforemen-
tioned cases, we are not as certain as were the lower courts that the requirements of
Article 1497 were met so as to brand I.M. Owen's disguised donations as donations
omnium bonorum." Owen v. Owen, 336 So. 2d 782,786 (La. 1976) (emphasis added).
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from the original donee had acquired a clear title to the tracts involved.24 In
effect, this decision means that a donation omnium bonorum although
branded as a nullity by article 1497 of the Civil Code, is nevertheless
translative of ownership, particularly when the donation is disguised in the
form of a sale. In this respect, it follows the rationale in Jenkins v. Svarva,25
in which, on facts that for all practical purposes are identical, the supreme
court held that a third party purchaser in good faith who, relying on the
public record, had purchased property from vendees of the donee, had
acquired good title to the property by the acquisitive prescription of 10 years
as against the donor who had asserted the nullity of the donation under
article 1497.26 With this no one can seriously disagree. Were one to follow
the rules formulated by the court of appeal, a purchaser would be saddled
with the impossible burden of ascertaining in every instance, beyond the
record, that his vendor's author in title had not deprived himself of the things
necessary for his sustenance when he sold or gave the immovable, or that he
had not disposed of everything he had. No one declares or is expected to
declare, in an act of conveyance that he is or is not disposing of all of his
property, or that he is or is not reserving enough for his subsistence!
Viewed in its proper light, article 1497 is a limitation on the right of
disposition. It comes to Louisiana from the Spanish law: 27 Law 4, Title 4,
Partida 5, did not require the donor to execute the donation if by executing
24. "We hold, therefore, that where there is nothing of record to indicate that the
transfer to the original vendee could have been annulled as a donation omnium
bonorum, and when an innocent party has purchased the land for valuable considera-
tion relying upon the public records, the third party takes the property free of the
unrecorded and secret equities." Id. at 788.
25. 131 La. 749, 60 So. 232 (1912).
26. "Conceding that an action to annul a donation omnium bonorum is not
prescriptible, does it follow that the property donated cannot be acquired by third
persons by prescription? We think not. . . If the donor stands by, silent and inactive,
and permits a third person to take and hold adverse possession of the property, he,
like any other owner, takes the chances of such adverse possession ripening into a
legal title. The nullity of the donation does not prevent a third person from acquiring
the property by the prescription of 30 years based on adverse possession alone, nor
does it prevent a third person from acquiring the property by the prescription of 10
years, based on a title translative of property, and on adverse possession." Id. , 60 So.
at 233 (Emphasis added).
The writer apologizes for the statement in 34 LA. L. REV. 219, 228, 229 (1974) to
the effect that the donation omnium bonorum particularly where disguised as a sale,
constitutes an act translative of ownership which can be the basis for the acquisitive
prescription of 10 years as against any one other than the donor himself which was
inadvertently made in error.
27. 1 La. Legal Archives, Projet, p. 207 (1937). The redactors give Recopilaci6n
de Castille, Book 5, tit. 10, law 8, as the source of this article.
[Vol. 37
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it, he would have deprived himself of the means of earning a livelihood.
Later, Law 69 of the Laws of Toro, subsequently carried forward as Law 2,
Title 7, Book 10 of the Novisima Recopilaci6n, prohibited the donation of
all the property of the donee, although the donation comprised only the
present property of the donor. 21 And the same limitation presently exists in
article 364 of the Civil Code of Spain, although the rule is there stated in
permissive terms, i.e. , the donor may dispose of all of his property provided
he reserves enough for his subsistence. 29 The reason for the limitation is, as
was the case under the prior laws, the protection of the vendor from his own
folly or prodigality.3" But under the Spanish law, the donation omnium
bonorum is not null ipso facto. The Spanish law recognizes the principle, as
does French and Louisiana law, that a donation inter vivos retains its effect
during the life of the donor, so that the donation omnium bonorum must
produce all its effects until it is proved that as a result thereof, the donor has
rendered himself impecunious.3 1 Furthermore, under article 634 of the
Spanish Civil Code, the donation omnium bonorum, when proved to be
one, is null only as to the excess. 32 It should logically follow, therefore, that
the donee, having become the perfect owner of the thing given by an act
translative of ownership as distinguished from an act that conveys only a
precarious title, may freely dispose of the thing given and that his purchaser
will acquire a valid title.
The problem presented in Owen v. Owen is only one of the many that
have arisen in connection with the interpretation and application of article
1497. Although the article seems to be free from ambiguity, in fact it is not,
and much confusion has arisen as to its exact meaning. 31 Questions may be
asked, for example, as to whether article 1497 establishes an additional
cause for the revocation of donations, 34 rather than an absolute nullity, and
28. "Ninguno pueda hacer donaci6n de todos sus bienes, aunque lo haga
solamente de los presentes."
29. "La donaci6n podri comprender todos los bienes del donante, o parte de
ellos, con tal que 6ste se reserve en plena propiedad o en usufructo, lo necesario para
vivir en un estado correspondiente a sus circumstancias."
30. 5 MANRESA, COMENTARIOS AL C6DIGO CIVIL ESPA4OL 129 (1932) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MANRESA].
31. Id. at 128-29.
32. Id.
33. Compare the cases referred to in the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit in 325 So. 2d 283, 286 n. 1. See also footnotes 35 & 36, infra.
34. Since donations inter vivos are essentially irrevocable and retain their effect
during the life of the donor (LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1468, 1503), they cannot be revoked
at will (LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1529, 1531) and can only be revoked for the causes
enumerated in LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1559, 1560. The provisions of LA. CIV. CODE art.
1497 are not found in the Code Napol6on.
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if so, who may institute such an action and to what extent should the
revocation be decreed? Could it be said that the right of revocation, if such it
is, should be personal to the donor and that he may exercise it only so long as
the subject matter of the donation is still in the hands of the donee?35 Should
the right exist also in favor of the spouse or the presumptive forced heirs of
the donor who, should the donor become impecunious, will have to assume
the obligations of support and maintenance prescribed by articles ,119 and
229 of the Civil Code? And should the right survive in favor of the heirs of
the donor in view of the fact that after his death, the evil sought to be
corrected no longer exists?36 It is clear that a reappraisal of the entire subject
matter is called for,37 and although the writer has no ready answers for these
questions, the following is suggested for arriving at a correct and satisfac-
tory solution. If article 1497 is to be retained as part of the Louisiana law, 38 it
should be given a meaning compatible with the reasons and the spirit of the
very law it purports to adopt, i.e., the protection of the donor against his
own folly or prodigality. As a limitation on the power of disposition, article
1497 should be construed as containing an additional ground for the
revocation of donations, and not as creating an absolute nullity. The law
should thus be invoked only by the donor himself, and possibly by those
who would have the obligation of supporting him for the rest of his life, if, as
a result of the donation, he has rendered himself a public charge. After his
35. Cf. Langrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (1854).
36. See Bernard v. Noel, 45 La. Ann. 1135, 1137, 13 So. 737,738 (1893), in which
the court wisely states: "The nullity declared by article 1497 of the Civil Code is
absolute only relatively to the particular persons in whose special interest it was
passed, and among them cannot be classed [the collateral heirs of the donor] invoking
it when she had not done so herself. . . . In the case at bar the right to invoke the
nullity was a personal one, in the sense that when she died the right to revoke the act
died also. To discover the true meaning of a law we must often consider the reason
and spirit of it, the cause which induced the legislature to enact it, and the mischief
which it sought to prevent or remedy. However general may be the terms in which it is
couched, it only extends to those things or persons it appears the legislature intended
it to reach and apply to. The law in question, in its enactment, did not have in view the
collateral heirs, and it certainly was not passed for their benefit." (Emphasis added).
37. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 180 La. 35, 156 So. 166 (1934) (holding that the right
is personal to the donor; that it cannot be instituted by the presumptive forced heirs of
the donor; and that after the death of the donor, his heirs may institute the action but
"only to the extent of their legitime. ") (Emphasis added); Succession of Turgeau, 130
La. 650, 58 So. 497 (1912); Cf. Litton v. Stephens, 187 La. 918, 175 So. 619 (1939);
Caraway v. LeBlanc, I La. App. 192 (1924) (holding that the donation is void ab initio
and allowing the heirs of the donor to set it aside after his death).
38. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1528 which, but for art. 1497, would permit the
donation of all the present property of the donor, prohibiting only the donation of
future property.
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death, the evil that the law seeks to prevent no longer exists and the right that
the donor had should die with him. After the death of the donor, his forced
heirs should only be permitted to exercise the right, which is now theirs, to
reduce the dispositions made by him if proved to have been made in excess
of the disposable portion. 9 The writer believes that the security of titles
requires these solutions. As for the rest, Owen v. Owen and Jenkins v.
Svarva seem to resolve three important points: (1) the donation omnium
bonorum is not null ipso facto, as the Spanish say; its nullity can be
established only after proof of the essential elements of article 1497; (2)
since the donation omnium bonorum may form the basis for the acquisitive
prescription of 10 years in good faith, the nullity declared by article 1497
cannot be classed as an absolute nullity; and (3) where the donation is
disguised as a sale or other onerous contract, a purchaser in good faith,
relying on the public record, acquires an indefeasible title as against the
heirs of the donor, even without the aid of the acquisitive prescription of 10
years. Nothing, however, should prevent the revocation of the donation
where fraud has been practiced. 4°
From another point of view, since the prohibition of article 1533 is no
more, 41 a donor who disposes of all of his present property gratuitously,
with reservation of usufruct, will certainly have reserved enough for his
subsistence assuming of course that what he had in the first place was
sufficient to take care of his needs.
Revocation
A donation inter vivos is a gratuitous contract whereby the donor
divests himself at present and irrevocably of the thing given in favor of the
donee 42 and which, as any other contract, requires the concurrence of the
reciprocal consent of the parties and does not become perfect until it is
accepted by the donee. 3 Consequently, it may not be revoked unilaterally
or by the sole and arbitrary will of the donor." Nevertheless, since
donations inter vivos may be made subject to any valid charges or conditions
39. This is the solution that obtains under article 634 of the Civil Code of Spain.
See MANRESA at 128-29. The right to institute this action, however, would prescribe
in five years from the death of the donor under LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542.
40. Broussard v. Doucet, 236 La. 217, 107 So. 2d 448 (1958).
41. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1533, as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 210.
42. Id. art. 1468.
43. Id. art. 1540.
44. Id. art. 1529.
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that the donor may impose on the donee, 45 such donations may be judicially
resolved at the instance of the donor or his heirs for the non-performance of
such charges or conditions.' In Mobly v. Lee47 the donor, "in considera-
tion for the love and affection she bears to [the donee] . . .and for her
personal care . . ." donated 60 acres of land to her niece. Subsequently
the donor executed a unilateral act of revocation before a notary public, in
which she stated that the donation "was an onerous donation given for the
promise of the personal care of herself by the donee" and that the donee had
failed to care for her. Notwithstanding, the donee subsequently sold the
property to the defendant; and the plaintiffs, the lawful heirs of the donor,
apparently alleging the onerous character of the donation and the effective-
ness of the revocation, instituted a petitory action claiming the ownership of
the property. The court seems to have had difficulty in resolving the issue
presented which, as the court stated, was "whether the. . . donation...
was purely gratuitous. If it was, then the subsequent revocation thereof...
was of no effect." 4 8 The problem seems to have been whether the words
"and for her personal care" transformed the donation into an onerous one.
It was the position of the court that "[i]f the donation [was] in fact onerous,
then it [was] not a real donation and the rules for the construction of
contracts apply." '49 Then, by reference to the articles on obligations and
particularly article 1958 of the Civil Code, it resolved the ambiguity in the
act of donation against the donor and concluded that the donation was
purely gratuitous and accordingly that the revocation was ineffective. The
writer finds fault with this approach (1) because it leaves the impression that
an onerous donation may be revoked unilaterally; and (2) because an
onerous donation, i.e., a donation that imposes charges or conditions upon
the donee, is nonetheless a gratuitous disposition subject to the rules
applicable to donations, except where the value of the thing given does not
greatly exceed (by one-half) the value of the charge imposed.50 It does not
appear from the report that these values were ever considered by the court. If
indeed the donation had been made on condition that the donee should
support and care for the donor, the remedy of the plaintiff should have been
to sue for the revocation of the donation for the non-performance of the
charges imposed. 5
45. Id. art. 1527.
46. Id. arts. 1559-61; 1567.
47. 318 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 632.
49. Id. at 634.
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1526. In this case the transaction is treated as a simple
onerous contract.
51. See Voinche v. Town of Marksville, 124 La. 712, 50 So. 662 (1909).
[Vol. 37
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TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
Formal Requirements
In Succession of Greer v. Wiggins,52 a legatee under an olographic
testament dated "April 49, 1943" appealed from a default judgment in
favor of the forced heirs of the deceased declaring the nullity of the
testament because of the uncertainty of the date. In the court of appeal, the
appellant's contention, that the requirement for an exact and certain date
was of no significance because there were no other competing wills, was
rejected and, on the authority of Succession of Beird5 3 and its progeny, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed. On rehearing, however, and noting
that in Succession of Boyd54 the supreme court had, in the interim,
"changed or at least clarified the law," the court reversed its judgment and,
over the objection of the appellees, 55 remanded the case to allow the
appellant an opportunity to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the exact
date on which the testament had been written. The appellant's original
contention, that the requirement for an exact date was not significant under
the facts presented, was again rejected, the court holding that certainty as to
the month and year alone was insufficient to support the validity of the
testament. The decision is sound. Under article 1588 of the Civil Code the
date is not only an essential part of the olographic testament, but it is also
necessary to determine, for example, whether at the time of its execution,
the testator had testamentary capacity, whether the testament was written
before or after the birth of a child, 56 or whether it was the last of two or more
testaments. A date that lacks any of its component parts (the day, the month
and the year) or a date, the component parts of which are unclear or
ambiguous and cannot reasonably be ascertained by other admissible
evidence, constitutes no date at all.
In Succession of Harris, 7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that
a statutory will typewritten in 2 mm size type was a valid will notwithstand-
ing the fact that the testator, even with the aid of his reading glasses, was
unable to read anything written in a type size smaller than 10 mm. Since the
statute58 "does not require recital or proof that the will was actually read by
52. 315 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
53. 145 La. 756, 82 So. 881 (1919).
54. 306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975), noted in 36 LA. L. REV. 366 (1976).
55. The judgment below had gone by default; appellant should not be permitted
to assert on appeal a defense not raised in the lower court.
56. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1705.
57. 329 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 862 (La. 1976)
("no error of law").
58. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1964).
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the testator," the court said, the fact "that the testator did not read the will
does not invalidate it. 59 In the writer's opinion, the issue before the court
was not the validity vel non of the will, but the capacity of the testator to
make it. A person who cannot read either because he does not know how or
because he is otherwise incapacitated is declared incapable to make a will
either in the mystic form, 60 or in the form provided for by R.S. 9:2442. The
evident purpose of the law is to safeguard against fraud, imposition, and
deceit. The testator should be able to compare what has been written with
what his wishes are regarding the ultimate disposition of his patrimony, and
the fact that the testator may choose to read or not to read the testament that
has been prepared for him is of no consequence. In this case the report
indicates that the testator could not read this particular testament because the
print was too small. He was thus in the same position, in relation to this will,
as if he had not known how to read, and consequently, legally incapable of
making it. The point has now become moot regarding the statutory will
inasmuch as the Louisiana legislature, by Act 333 of 1976, has virtually
repealed R.S. 9:2443, insofar as it was applicable to the testator himself, by
providing the method for and the formalities to be observed in the confection
of the statutory will " when the testator is blind or does not know how or is
not able to read." It should be noted however, that in such cases the new
legislation requires that the testament be read aloud to the testator, the
notary, and the three witnesses in the presence of each other, which should
be an adequate safeguard. But persons who cannot read or know not how to
read are still incapable of making a mystic testament or of being witnesses to
statutory wills. 61 It is hoped that the rationale of this decision will not be
extended to cases involving mystic testaments.
Interpretation of Testaments
In Carter v. Succession of Carter,62 the testator had made an olo-
graphic testament, valid in form, in which, after making a special bequest to
his wife of all his interest "in our home place consisting of fifteen acres
more or less" he "further" bequeathed all of his separate property and "all
cash, bonds and other valuables" he would possess at his death. Alleging
that the "further" bequest named no legatee, the testator's brothers and
59. 329 So. 2d at 494.
60. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1586: "Those who know not how or are unable to write
(sic) [read] and those who know not how or are not able to sign their names, cannot
make dispositions in the form of the mystic will."
61. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (1964):". . . [T]hose who know not how or are not able to
read cannot . . be attesting witnesses [to a statutory will]."
62. 332 So. 2d 439 (La. 1976).
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sisters, as his legitimate heirs of the second class, claimed that the testator
had died intestate as to his separate estate as against the widow in
community who claimed the entire succession as universal legatee. The
supreme court, reversing the court of appeal6 3 and reinstating the judgment
of the lower court, had no difficulty in concluding that since the testator had
already named his wife his legatee, it was his clear intention by his
"further" bequest, to constitute her as the legatee of his entire estate.
64
Prohibited Substitutions
In Roberts v. Cristina 65 the testator appointed Louis DeSonier Jr.
"or his successor" as attorney for the executrix of his estate. Mr. DeSonier
was subsequently elevated to the bench and consequently was unable to
serve, and when the testator died the defendants, the widow and two
surviving children of the testator employed other attorneys to handle the
succession, whereupon plaintiff, DeSonier's former partner in the practice
of law whom DeSonier considered as his successor and to whom he had
turned over all his files,' instituted this suit claiming his fee as the attorney
entitled to handle the succession of the deceased. Holding that the designa-
tion of DeSonier as the attorney for the executrix was a legacy conferring
upon the legatee (DeSonier) the right to choose his successor, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that the legacy contained a prohibited
substitution under article 1520 and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The writer
believes that the court was in error on three counts: (1) in holding that the
appointment of the attorney constituted a legacy, which it does not;67 (2) in
citing Rivet v. Battistella as authority for the proposition that such an
appointment constitutes a legacy, which it is not;68 and (3) in holding that
63. 321 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
64. "It would require a strained and unnatural interpretation to conclude that the
testator declared that he further bequeathed all of his interest in his separate
property, and all of the cash, bonds and other valuables he possessed but neverthe-
less failed to name the legatee or legatees who were to be the beneficiaries. Such a
reading renders all stipulations after 'I further bequeath' ineffective. Such a result is
contrary to Article 1713 of the Civil Code directing that 'a disposition must be
understood in the sense in which it can have effect, rather than that in which it can
have none'." 332 So. 2d at 442.
65. 323 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 889.
67. A legacy is a disposition of all or a part of the testator's patrimony. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1469.
68. What the court is saying in Battistella is that the designation of the attorney
for the executor by the testator constitutes a valid condition imposed by the testator
upon the legatees and which is binding on the legatees. In the language of the court:
"The only question presented is whether such designation in a will is valid and
binding on those who take under the will.
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the legacy, if such it was, contained a prohibited substitution, which it does
not. 69 If the testator's designation or appointment of the attorney was a
legacy, and if it contained a substitution of legatees, then it is submitted that
the substitution is not a prohibited one but a substitution permitted under
article 1521 of the Civil Code that provides that a legacy to a second named
legatee in case the legatee first named does not or is unwilling to take is
valid. It is to be regretted that the supreme court refused to review this
decision.7 °
Revocation
In Succession of Melancon, 71 the testator, evidently intending to
revoke expressly two of the legacies contained in his statutory testament,
had written beside each of them the notation "this item revoked" 72 followed
by his signature. Observing that neither notation was dated, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that, although entirely written and signed by
the testator, the notations were not made in the form prescribed for the
olographic testament 73 and therefore was ineffective as revocations. A
strict application of article 1692 requires this result, and the decision
"If such a designation be not binding on those to take under the will, then the
reason must be because such designation is contrary to law or good morals, or in
violation of some well-recognized public policy. For the 'donor may impose on the
donee any charges or conditions he pleases provided they contain nothing contrary to
law or good morals.' R.C.C. 1527, 1519.
"But there is nothing contrary to good morals in such a designation and there is
no law which forbids it .... Rivet v. Battistella, 167 La. 766, 120 So. 289 (1929)
(emphasis added).
69. The substitution prohibited by article 1520 is the bequest that contains (1) a
double disposition in full ownership of the same thing to two or more persons who are
called to receive it, one after the other (2) imposing a charge upon the legatee first to
take to preserve the thing given (3) to be transmitted at his death to the substitute,
i.e., in successive order. Cf. Marshall v. Pearce, 34 La. Ann. 577 (1882) (Hamlin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) and Sanders, C.J., (dissenting) in Succes-
sion of Simms, 250 La. 177, 239-50, 195 So. 2d 114, 137-40 (1967).
In this case, there was nothing bequeathed, much less in full ownership; there
was no charge to preserve anything, much less an obligation to transmit anything to
another at death.
70. 328 So. 2d 109 (La. 1976) (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
71. 330 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
72. Actually, the two legacies were numbered "F" and "I," respectively. With
regard to item "F" the testator had written: "I revoke Section F." As to Legacy "I"
the testator had interlined through it the notation "This item Revoked."
73. "Had Dr. Melancon supplied a handwritten date to his notations and
signature he would have validly revoked the bequest to the Ward children and to
Linton Allen, however, Dr. Melancon's alteration, as written, is clearly not in any
testamentary form recognized under Louisiana law." 330 So. 2d at 682.
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appears to be sound but only inasmuch as these notations were actually
intended as express, as distinguished from tacit, revocations." The writer
was left with the impression, however, that the defacing, erasure, oblitera-
tion or destruction of a testament, or of a part thereof, other than an
olographic testament, would likewise be ineffective as a revocation.7" The
writer suggests that, since under article 1691 of the Civil Code, a tacit
revocation results from any act that supposes a change of will, 76 an effective
total revocation may very well result from the destruction or laceration by
the testator of any testament made by him, or from erasures or obliterations
made by the testator of any words that are essential to the validity of the
testament. 77 So also, it would seem that the obliteration or erasure made by
the testator of a disposition contained in his will should result in a partial
tacit revocation thereof, whether the testament is in the olographic, or in any
other form. 78
BENEFIT PLANS
Treating the provisions contained in employee retirement and profit
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1692: "The act by which a testamentary disposition is
[expressly] revoked, must be made in one of the forms prescribed for testaments, and
clothed with the same formalities."
75. "We recognize that Article 1589 of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence
interpreting the provisions thereof recognize that the writer of an olographic will may
alter or completely change testamentary dispositions in his hand written testament
without affecting its validity so long as the alterations or additions are made by the
hand of the testator. In such cases it is not necessary that the testator's approval
appear on the face of the will itself. . . . This informality regarding change in
testamentary dispositions is not allowed, however, in other forms of wills rather as to
such other forms of wills the provisions of R. C. C. Article 1692 apply." 330 So. 2d at
682 (Emphasis added).
76. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1691: "The revocation... [is] tacit when it results from
some other disposition of the testator, or from some act which supposes a change of
will." See also Succession of Muh, 34 La. Ann. 394, 398 (1883), where the court
states: "If the testator has made another disposition, repugnant to and inconsistent
with the previous one, although nothing is said about revoking the former, a tacit
revocation will thereby be made. So also if he has done any act which supposes a
change of will, let that act be what it may, provided always the intention to revoke is
fairly and legally deducible from it, a tacit revocation will result from the act."
(Emphasis added).
77. This includes the erasure or obliteration of the date in an olographic will, for
example, or the erasure or obliteration of the testator's signature or of one of the
attesting witnesses, in other kinds of wills.
78. Cf. LA. CIV. CODEart. 1589; Succession of Butterworth, 195 La. 115,196So.
39 (1940); Succession of Muh, 34 La. Ann. 394 (1883); Succession of Makofsky, 120
So. 2d 277 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960). See 11 AUBRY ET RAU at § 725 to the effect that a
testament by public act may be tacitly revoked in the same manner as an olographic
testament, by the obliteration, destruction or laceration thereof.
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sharing plans for the payment of death benefits as analogous to life
insurance contracts, recent court of appeal decisions had held that the rules
of the Louisiana Civil Code relative to donations inter vivos and mortis
causa were inapplicable, that the assignment of the death benefit to a
designated beneficiary in conformity with the plans was effective as a
gratuitous disposition, and that the accumulated contributions payable upon
death to the beneficiary designated by the deceased employee did not form
part of his succession.79 These decisions do not appear to have taken into
consideration prior adjudications in which the court had refused to extend
the rationale of the cases dealing with life insurance to other devices which
might effectively deprive a forced heir of his l6gitime or a surviving spouse
of his share in the community.80 These decisions did, however, distinguish
cases dealing with the apportionment of potential benefits to which the
employee himself would be entitled upon his retirerment and which charac-
terized the benefits as separate or community funds depending upon
whether the interest of the retiree was acquired prior to or during the
existence of the community of gains."' In T.L. James & Co. v. Montgom-
ery,82 the supreme court, although recognizing on rehearing the contractual
79. Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4thCir. 1974); Succession
of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Cf. T.L. James & Co. v.
Montgomery, 308 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975). Accordingly, the beneficiary
took free and clear from the rights of forced heirs and free from the rights of surviving
spouses in community. In Mendoza, where the deceased employee had failed to
name a beneficiary and where the proceeds (which were financed by the employer
alone) were thus payable to the estate of the deceased, the court likewise held that the
death benefit was the separate property of the deceased employee who had become a
participant in the plan prior to his marriage. In Rockvoan, a lump-sum death benefit
(resulting from contributions made by both the employer and the employee pursuant
to a plan in which the deceased had become a participant 15 days prior to his marriage)
was held to be separate property of the deceased in which the surviving spouse had no
community rights, and the proceeds were held to be payable to the son of the
deceased by a prior marriage as the designated beneficiary thereof.
80. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952); Succession of
Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947); Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 199 So. 2d 925, 926 (1967). In these cases the courts,
although recognizing the authority of Congress, in the issuance of bonds, to superim-
pose on the Louisiana law new methods of making gratuitous dispositions, neverthe-
less held that the donations thus made are subject to the restrictions imposed by the
substantive law of Louisiana and that the rights of the alternate co-owner or of the
beneficiary upon death to receive the proceeds of the bonds is limited by his duty to
account to a surviving spouse in community or to a forced heir for any invasion of
their respective rights.
81. Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 295 So,
2d 809, 814 (La. 1974); Langlinais v. David, 289 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970);
Lafitte v. Lafitte, 232 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
82. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
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designation of a beneficiary as a valid gratuitous disposition, 83 expressly
overrules the earlier appellate decisions, particularly the Rockvoan and
Mendoza cases,8 4 and holds that the contributions paid by an employer into
the retirement fund to the credit of the employee, unlike the proceeds of life
insurance, constitute additional compensation for services rendered and
accordingly, the benefits received or to be received by the employee upon
retirement or by his designated beneficiary upon death are subject to the
claims of forced heirs and of a surviving spouse in community.85 In that
case, Montgomery, who had been married twice, became a participant in
the company's profit sharing and retirement plans during his first marriage.
In 1958, following his divorce, he married his surviving spouse. One son,
Thomas, was born of the first marriage, and a second son, Monty George,
was born of the second marriage. Shortly before his death in 1971,
Montgomery had designated Thomas as the beneficiary of both plans. At the
time of his death, the proceeds from the profit sharing plan amounted to
$26,330.14 and the proceeds from the retirement plan to $37,545.30. In a
concursus proceeding initiated by T.L. James and the trustees of the funds,
Thomas asserted his right to the entire proceeds as the designated ben-
eficiary upon death; the two wives each claimed their respective community
interests; and Monty George claimed his 16gitime. Having concluded that
the benefits payable under the plans constituted additional remuneration, it
was a simple matter for the court to divide the" total contributions paid into
the employee's accounts" into three classifications: (1) those made during
the first marriage, belonging to the first community, one-half to each
spouse; (2) those made when the deceased employee was unmarried,
belonging to his separate estate; and (3) those made during his second
marriage, belonging to the second community, one-half to each spouse.86
83. On original hearing the court had held that the customary beneficiary
designation was an invalid disposition mortis causa. LA. R.S. 23:651-653, enacted by
La. Act 494 of 1976, expressly provides that the beneficiary designation is effective
and need not be in testamentary form.
"84. See note 79, supra.
85. "We thus hold, consistent with the views expressed in the earlier part of this
opinion. . . that, although the contractual beneficiary may receive in full ownership
the share of the funds passing to him by virtue of the decedent's contractual
designation of him as beneficiary, he does so with the obligation to account to any
complaining forced heir or spouse in community if his receipt of the proceeds violates
eituer the former's 16gitime or the latter's community ownership rights. 332
So. 2d at 855.
86. The difficulty with the formula is, as pointed out by Professor LeVan, that it
can work only where the plan actually calls for the establishment of a separate
account for each employee and where the employer's contributions paid into each
account directly reflect benefits earned by the employee during that period, which is
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The judgment of the court thus recognizes the first son as the contractual
beneficiary of the proceeds, receiving them as owner, less the amount found
to be due to the surviving widow as her share of the contributions made
during the second community, and less any funds that would be due to the
second son in satisfaction of his l6gitime if found to have been impaired by
the otherwise valid contractual disposition.8 7 It is interesting to note that the
court reaffirmed its position in Teachers' Retirement System v. Vial88 in
which it held that the accumulated contributions deducted from the salary of
a teacher during the existence of the marriage and credited to his individual
account in the teachers' retirement fund, as provided by law, were the
separate property of the teacher rather than a community asset and that the
assignment of the death benefits thereunder constituted a valid disposition
of the funds payable and belonging to the designated beneficiary notwith-
standing the formalities of the Civil Code relative to donations mortis causa.
Although the question as to whether the payee-beneficiary of the death
benefits would be accountable to the surviving spouse for one-half of the
contributions made by the teacher-spouse during the marriage, or to the
forced heir for his 16gitime, was rendered moot in the Vial case, 9
intermediate courts of appeal decisions are to the effect that the separate
estate of the teacher-spouse is indebted to the community for the "enhance-
ment" of his or her separate estate, 90 which in effect means that the retiree
has to pay to the non-teacher spouse one-half of the contributions paid
during the existence of the community. 9' It would thus appear that whether
one treats the retirement benefit as additional compensation to the employee
during the marriage (where contributions are made by the employer) or as
rarely the case since the contributions are more likely to "reflect the amount
necessary to maintain the overall actuarial soundness of the pension fund based on a
variety of facts most of which have little or no direct bearing on the increase in
benefits 'earned' by the employee." The Louisiana Estate Planner, Vol. 2, No. 6, p.
45 (June, 1976).
87. The claim of the first wife was disallowed on the grounds that she had
specifically prayed for the recognition of her son's claim as the beneficiary upon
death, and that it was only in the alternative that she asserted her own claim.
88. 317 So. 2d 179 (La. 1975).
89. As to the community claim, since the plaintiff had inherited the successions
of her mother and father, she had become both debtor and creditor of the same
amount and the debt had thus been extinguished by confusion. As to the claim for the
legitime, the court found that it had been satisfied by the amounts she had already
received from the succession of her father.
90. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408.
91. Blalock v. Blalock, 259 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Broyles v. Broyles,
215 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Moore v. Moore, 187 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1966).
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the separate estate of the employee (where the fund to be distributed consists
of the contributions made by the employee under the State Teachers'
Retirement System) the end result is the same. In both, the retiree is
accountable to the non-employee spouse for one-half of the benefits
received, and in both the designated beneficiary upon death is accountable
to forced heirs for their 16gitime.
In this connection, one should also consider Jochum v. Estate of
Fabre92 in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, assimilating the
accumulation of deductions from an employee's salary towards his retire-
ment to the proceeds due under an annuity contract, 93 holds, Under the
authority of Succession of Rabouin,94 that the fund thus created, whether
payable to the employee on retirement, or to his designated beneficiary upon
death, forms part of the estate of the employee to be included in the
inventory of his succession.
95
92. 313 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
93. Counsel for both parties had stipulated that they considered the accumula-
tion of deductions from the employee's salary as proceeds due under an annuity
contract, and the court so treated them. See id. at 871 n.l.
94. 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).
95. Cf. Moore v. Moore, 187 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), which excludes
from the inventory of community assets the benefits derived from the State Teachers
Retirement System.
